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PIERRE VOILLERY

LE KAZA DE STARA ZAGORA (ESKI ZAARA) SELON LES DESCRIPTIONS PUBLIÉES PAR LE CARIGRADSKI VESTNIK (1858) ET LE DOCTEUR POYET (1859) (DEUXIÈME PARTIE)

Stara Zagora est une ville de Roumélie bulgare d'environ 20.000 habitants au milieu du XIXe siècle. Elle présente la particularité d'avoir fait l'objet de deux enquêtes statistiques, la première par le Bulgare G. Slavov en 1856, la seconde par le Français Poyet en 1859.

Ces deux textes sont connus mais n'ont jamais fait l'objet d'une étude systématique. C'est la première fois qu'ils sont re-publiés in extenso. Ils sont réunis ici pour la première fois. Ils permettent pourtant de faire se dessiner sous nos yeux une communauté bulgare dans les différents aspects de son existence en pleine période du tanzimat, qu'ils soient géographiques, administratifs, communautaires, démographiques, économiques, fiscaux, commerciaux, culturels ou religieux.

La première partie de cette étude s'attache à mettre en valeurs les quatre premiers volets. La seconde partie décrit les autres aspects de la vie de cette cité qui, par sa normalité, est à l'image de bien d'autres villes de Roumélie ottomane au moment où le mouvement national bulgare est en plein essor et où se tissent de nouveaux rapports entre les communautés de confession différente.

PETROS SIOUSSIOURAS

GEOPOlITICAL EXPEDENCIES AND FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN GREECE, SERBIA AND BULGARIA FOLLOWING THE SIGNING OF THE LAUSANNE TREATY

The Asia Minor Catastrophe has left a host of problems that needed immediate resolution. At that point in time, two mistakes of grave political significance, developed into severe blows weakening further the already enfeebled Greek foreign policy. The first mistake was committed by the renowned international relations expert, Nikolaos Politis, who served as the Greek representative in the League of Nations. Politis and his Bulgarian oppo-
site number, Christo Kalfv concluded a Protocol, the so-called Politis-Kalfv Protocol— which recognized the slavophone population of Macedonia as Bulgarians. The second mistake was committed by General Theodoros Pangalos, a well-respected figure, who gained his reputation in the war of Asia Minor. The second mistake was far more critical than the first one, as Pangalos tried to satisfy his secret wish to reoccupy Eastern Thrace, through a military dictatorship. Immediately after his ascent to power, he concluded with Yugoslavia a number of agreements, creating a network of relations favourable to Yugoslavia and establishing a Serbian port in Thessaloniki. Because of the one-sided and burdensome nature these agreements had for Greece, they were termed the “Pangalos’ Agreements”. The ensuing rise of Eleftherios Venizelos to power marked the beginning of a new era in Greek politics. He laid down new foundations, obeying the spirit of the League of Nations on international cooperation and public diplomacy, revising at the same time, the Greek foreign policy.

**BOŠKO I. BOJOVIĆ**

“QUI HABET TEMPUS HABET VITAM”

THE QUESTION OF THESSALONICA AND THE CRISIS IN THE BALKANS

YUGOSLAVIA ON THE THRESHOLD OF WAR: BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND COUP D’ETAT (OCTOBER, 1940 - MARCH, 1941)

This article treats, with special reference to the question of Salonika, the long protracted negotiations leading up to the reluctant signing of the Tripartite Pact by Prince-Regent Paul’s government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on 25 March 1941. Hitler’s respect for the Serbs’ fighting abilities (e.g. on the Salonika front) led him to make considerable concessions to the Yugoslavs. The inviolability of their frontiers and sovereignty was guaranteed, military assistance and the use of their territory for the movement of troops and military matériel were not insisted upon. Hitler even intimated that Salonika would be ceded to them. The Yugoslavs thus faced a dilemma. They did not want the city, in which Yugoslavia had a free zone sufficient for her needs in the Aegean Sea region, for reasons of sentiment; acceptance would have been dishonourable, a betrayal of their traditional ally Greece, the land of origin, indeed, of their ruler’s wife. On the other hand, encircled as they were by the Axis powers elsewhere, Salonika was their only possible strategic link with the Allies with whom their sympathies lay. Furthermore, refusal of such an offer would, in Hitler’s eyes, have cast doubts upon their sincerity. In the
event, against Croat opposition. Serbian pro-Allied sentiment allowed a plot of officers to overthrow the government thus provoking Hitler’s wrath and bringing Yugoslavia into World War II with the consequent enormous losses, around 1,500,000 civil and military dead, a demographic loss of 2,438,000, many thousands of maimed persons, horrendous matériel destruction and so on.

GEORGES-HENRI SOUTOU
FRANCE AND THE BALKANS 1944-1955

Since World War I France had a geopolitical vision for the Balkans: she hoped that ethnic tensions would ease, and that as many Balkan countries as possible would get together to resist foreign threats, coming from Germany before 1945, from the USSR afterwards.

After 1945, and even more after 1949 and the end of the civil war, Franco-Greek relations did not pose any major problem and Paris supported, cautiously but unmistakably, the Royal government. It was different with the communist countries in that region. With Rumania and Bulgaria as soon as 1946 there were no meaningful relations left. The case was different with Yugoslavia, because of the Tito-Stalin break. There France’s role was not unimportant, even if she hesitated between trying to regain her former traditional role in the Balkans, without taking into account the changed ideological landscape, or stressing Western unity against communism. Supporters of the former line were ready to go very far with Tito, those of the later did not forget that Tito remained after all a communist leader and they were quite cautious and contented themselves with Tito’s break with Moscow without sharing the illusion there could be a “national” kind of communism.

Generally speaking the French were anxious not to provoke the Soviets. That is why, for instance, they were quite lukewarm towards Greece’s and Turkey’s admission in NATO.

By 1955 Paris witnessed with satisfaction the lessening of ethnic tensions. The Greek-Yugoslav thaw allowed Macedonia and Northern Epirus to become much calmer. As for Yugoslavia, one believed in the Titoist kind of federal system to solve the problem of relations among the different nationalities. But a new problem was seen in Cyprus with the Greek-Turkish tension, and one was conscious of the dwindling French influence because of France’s problems (the war in Algeria and an outmoded political system) and because the Anglo-Saxons and the Germans were developing their influence in that region much more efficiently.
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VAN COUFODAKIS

THE U.S. AND THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY IN S.E. EUROPE
AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Recent developments in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean raise serious concerns about regional stability and about the long term consequences of American policy in this region.

The paper reviews how the search for regional stability determined American policy since 1947 and, especially, since the end of the Cold War. The Post-Cold War crises in the Balkans became a new source of friction in US-European relations. American interventions in problems such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo and Imia temporarily defused these problems. However, a future resolution of these problems may create a new source of regional instability. Since 11 September 2001, the “war on terrorism” became the new focus of American foreign and security policy. As in the past, American policy continues to rely on unholy alliances with unsavory regimes to attain its objectives. This is likely to lead to “blowback” situations contributing to greater regional instability.

DAVID WISNER

THE EVOLUTION OF US POLICY-MAKING TOWARD SOUTHEAST EUROPE
IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

US policy toward the Balkans in the 1990’s seemed at once to give a new, post-Cold War peeminence to Southeast Europe, and to maintain a sort of status quo in the manner in which policy was actually formulated. Using an analytical scheme designed by Kegley and Wittkopf, this essay seeks to understand this apparent paradox, and to elucidate the tentative points at which a new policy paradigm emerged, particularly after 1995. The paper closes with contemporary observations by policy insiders which presage both the Kosovo crisis of 1999 and the National Security Doctrine of George W. Bush.


GEORGIOS SPYROPOULOS

THE NEW “NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA”

This article discusses the three different perceptions, based on three
different traditions, which shaped the American foreign policy since 1990 until
nowadays, with the present administration to be adherent of the last of these
three, the Jacksonian one. In this frame, US “National Security Strategy”,
announced in 2002, adopted the doctrine of prevention and pre-emptive action,
thus allowing US to act unilaterally against whomever they consider having
“aggressive” intentions. Even if Bush administration tried to present the new
doctrine as the result of 11th September’s events, it is more than clear that it
had already been conceived by the neoconservatives almost 10 years ago.
What is most disquieting, however, to the international community is the fear
of what is going to be happening in the sphere of the international relations if
the “pre-emptive strikes” policy of Bush’s administration finally prevails.

THEODORE A. COULOUMBIS

ANTI-AMERICANISM IN GREECE: TIME TO OVERCOME IT

This paper identifies the roots of anti-Americanism in Greece by listing a
number of political differences between Greeks and American administrations
of the past, especially in the 1967-1974 period.

It differentiates the concept of anti-Americanism in Greece from marginal
racistic reactions that target the american people as opposed to specific
leaders and administrations. The paper focuses on the major transformations
in Greece (especially after its entry in the European Union) and concludes that
today —given the converrence of values and interests— there are no longer
any reasons for sustaining the memories of the past.

FOTINI BELLOU

US POLICY IN BOSNIA: FROM OBSERVATION TO LEADERSHIP
TRANSATLANTIC DISAGREEMENTS IN MANAGING THE CRISIS

The policy preferences of Washington towards the war in Bosnia-Herze-
govina (BiH) reflected the US stance regarding post-Cold War engagement in
civil wars. It also reflected efforts to identify and project a Euro-Atlantic cooperation model in international crisis management. Abstention from commitment to an international peacekeeping operation, with US troops on the ground in order to implement an agreed peace settlement, was the premise by which US policy towards the war in BiH was formulated from 1992 to mid 1994. As this stance gradually began to tarnish relations with its European allies, Washington shifted its policy towards a piecemeal engagement. It was becoming obvious that a risk-free US leadership in BiH was challenging Washington’s status within NATO. In the face of serious European questions regarding the substance of US leadership in European security, Washington opted to lead international action (diplomatic and military) so as to end the war in BiH in the summer of 1995. This incidentally re-confirmed America’s leadership position and image in the context of European security.

ARISTOTLE TZIAMPIRIS

THE IMPACT OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND 9/11 ON GREEK-AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS

The paper will focus on the dynamic relationship between the United States and Greece in the aftermath of the Cold War. Emphasis will be placed on the analysis of US interventions in the Balkans and the ways in which they were perceived by Greece’s government and people. It will be argued that despite popular notions of confrontation, there ultimately exists a productive and complementary relationship that despite differences, has the potential of promoting stability and development in South Eastern Europe.

PHAEDON J. KOZYRIS

DELAYED LEARNING FROM KOSOVO: ANY CHANCE FOR COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS OF FACTS AND LAW?

In this piece, written in 1999 with a Postscript of 2003, the author examines whether the conditions for humanitarian intervention had been met for the NATO intervention in Kosovo. His negative conclusion is based not only on the absence of UN Security Council authorization but also on the blatant failure to exhaust all peaceful means, especially the use of unacceptable ultimatums to Yugoslavia at Rambouillet. In addition, there was excessive and disproportionate use of force and sides were taken against one of the two
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communities in a conflict for which both had some share of responsibility. Further, this was not only a matter of human rights but also of the preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the state which required a more comprehensive approach.

A review of history shows the complexity of the situation, with both sides bearing some of the blame, and emphasizes the need for impartial and compassionate international action. Instead, the Serbs were demonized and there was a cowboy-style shoot out which has produced predictably a continuing and expensive instability in an environment of lawlessness leading to the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo Serbs. In conclusion, it is to be regretted that this ill-advised action has given a bad name to humanitarian intervention with no decent end in sight.

In the Postscript, the author further expresses his grave concern about the modern use of massive barbarous firepower in ways that cause incredible and indiscriminate suffering to civilians, and the attempts to justify it as "collateral damage", which is even ironic when carried out under the banner of humanitarian intervention or preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction.

S PYRIDON SFETAS

FYROM IN THE CONTEXT OF AMERICAN POLICY (1995-2001)

During the Yugoslav war (1991-1995) the American policy supported FYROM's territorial integrity and called upon the Tirana government to harness the Albanians in FYROM. The objective of the Americans was to avert the spill-over of the crisis from Kosovo into FYROM. But after the Dayton agreement and NATO's military intervention in Yugoslavia the Albanian Question in Kosovo entered into a new dynamic phase. The new situation had its repercussions on FYROM where the Albanians demanded the status of equal nation. With the American support they succeeded in gaining a large autonomy (the agreement of Ohrid, 2001), but their aim is the secession from FYROM. Probably the Americans want to control the Balkan region due to the importance of Corridor 8 and so this fact upgrades the position of the Albanians in the Balkans as a counterbalance to the Balkan states.
DAVID L. PHILLIPS
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT: BALKANS 2010

David L. Phillips, formerly the deputy director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations of New York and a member of the Council’s Task Force, Balkans: 2010, analyzes the root of conflict in the South Balkans. His presentation describes the task force’s methodology, offers ideas enhancing trans-Atlantic cooperation, and suggests a phased process for addressing the question of Kosovo’s political status. Phillips underscores the inevitability of Kosovo’s independence through mutual agreement. He also proposes a formula for compensating Belgrade for its investment in Kosovo’s development.